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THE BENIGN HOUSING QUOTA: A LEGITIMATE WEAPON
TO FIGHT WHITE FLIGHT AND RESULTING
SEGREGATED COMIMUNITIES?
In 1967, the City of New York acquired fourteen square blocks on the Lower
East Side of Manhattan. The city, with the assistance of federal funding, in-
tended to build a large complex of low- and middle-income housing on the site.'
Between the start of construction in 1967 and partial completion in 1972, how-
ever, the proportion of whites in the area had declined dramatically both in
public housing projects and in the surrounding community.2 The area, which
had been stably integrated, was becoming racially transitional since, as the
whites evacuated the area, their former residences were occupied generally by
minorities. If the trend had continued, the area would have become inhabited
predominantly by minority group members and hence segregatedLa To counter
the white flight from the area, the City Housing Authority by-passed its own
regulations which gave priority to minority group members and provided newly
constructed apartments to white applicants who were ineligible under the exist-
ing regulations.4
Plaintiffs, black and Puerto Rican tenants of the City Housing Authority,
brought a class action on behalf of the present and former occupants who had
been displaced from the site during construction,5 demanding highest priority
in admission to the project and nullification of the leases of the present white
tenants.6 They alleged that the refusal of the City Housing Authority to abide
by its own regulation was racially motivated in contravention of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.7
Under the regulation, GM 1282,8 which was in effect at the time of the initial
relocation, priority was limited to the original project site residents. Under the
1. Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. Brief for Intervening-Defendants-Appelants at 10-11, Otero v. New York City Hous-
ing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
3. In reference to the flight of middle class whites from New York City see N.Y. Times,
May 29, 1973, at 1, col. S.
4. See note 9 infra and accompanying text.
5. 484 F.2d at 1126.
6. Id. at 1127.
7. Id. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 provides, in pertinent part: "It is the policy of the
United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). "The Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment shall... administer the programs and activities relating to housing and urban develop-
ment in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. §
3608(d) (5) (1970).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in pertinent part: 'No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 US.C. § 2000(d) (1970).
8. The policies of the Housing Authority are established by a board of three appointees.
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later-enacted GM 1810, however, first priority status was broadened to include
the residents of the entire urban renewal area of fourteen blocks.0 Plaintiffs
contended that although the latter regulation was adopted after the initial reloca-
tion, the City Housing Authority had bound itself by prior statements and actual
practice to abide by it.'0
The Authority argued that they had an affirmative duty to limit the number
of public housing units available to minority groups in order to promote inte-
grated housing and a racially stable community. It noted that allowing these
minority tenants to return to the site would create a concentrated racial pocket
which would further upset the already precarious racial balance of the Lower
East Side."1
Speaking for the Second Circuit, Judge Mansfield noted that the plaintiffs'
argument ordinarily would carry great weight. Nevertheless, the Housing Au-
thority's constitutional duty controlled and, therefore:
the Authority may limit the number of apartments to be made available to persons of
white or non-white races, including minority groups, where it can show that such
action is essential to promote a racially balanced community and to avoid concentrated
racial pockets that will result in a segregated community.12
Accordingly, Judge Mansfield remanded the case to the lower court for a
determination of whether allowing the minority displacees to return would
jeopardize the racial balance of the community, stating that the Authority must
produce "convincing evidence" that adherence to the neutral regulation would
almost certainly lead to de facto segregation."3
Once set, these broad policy determinations are formalized into staff directives and issued by
the Director of Management as General Memorandum of the Housing Authority (GM).
9. The order of priority in public housing is based upon urgency of need. The objective
criteria, as established by the Housing Authority, are, in order of importance: (1) area
residents who were displaced in building the project; (2) emergency situations including
condemnation and displacement because of other government action; (3) families or handi-
capped living in extremely substandard housing; (4) families residing in overcrowded condi-
tions; (5) families residing under conditions of health hardship; (6) families residing under
substandard or hardship conditions. GM 1810 (1972), cited in the appendix to Otero v.
New York City Housing Auth., 344 F. Supp. 737, 748-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
10. 484 F.2d at 1130-32.
11. Id. at 1132-33. In the lower court, Judge Lasker conceded that there was such an
affirmative duty. However, he concluded that the purpose of the legislation underlying the
affirmative duty was to benefit the minorities. Therefore, it could not be exercised to de-
prive the minorities of available housing. Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 354 F.
Supp. 941, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The circuit court reasoned, on the other hand, that the
underlying rationale was to further integration in public housing thereby benefitting "the
community as a whole, not just certain of its members." 484 F.2d at 1134. For an analysis
of agencies acting in opposition to established regulations see Note, Violations by Agencies of
Their Own Regulations, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 629 (1974).
12. 484 F.2d at 1140.
13. Id. at 1136, 1140. judge Lasker recently approved a settlement of the action as being
consistent with the opinion of the court of appeals. Otero v. New York City Housing Author-
ity, No. 72 Civ. 1733 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1974), summarized at 2 CCH Pov. L. Rep. q 18,640.
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I. THE HiSTORY OF TE FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAM AND TlE RIsE
OF THE RACIAL PROBLEM
The first federal statute establishing a national public housing program was
enacted in 1937 to solve the short-term housing problems of the "submerged
middle class."' 4 Under this legislation, apartment buildings were constructed
by local government agencies and financed through long-term bond issues.1"
Upon completion they were operated by local agencies with the rent received
from their temporarily impoverished tenants.16 During World War II, the em-
phasis shifted from housing the poor to providing housing for workers in war
industries and returning veterans. 17 Moreover, with the end of the war, Congress
"primed the pumps" with FRA and VA insured mortgages to keep capital
flowing into the construction industry as a hedge against depression.18 As a
result, the suburban housing boom began for veterans and the now-affluent
middle-class who, in effect, were forced to vacate public housing to subsidize
the suburban construction boom.' 9 At the same time, however, public housing
14. Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1970); see L. Friedman, Government
and Slum Housing 94-146 (1968).
15. Currently, the term "public housing" is used in reference to several types of projects.
The traditional type (and the one with which this Note is principally concerned) is based
on the continual ownership of the projects by local housing authorities. An architect is
retained by the authority to design and supervise the construction of the project on a
chosen site. The authority raises the funds necessary for construction and manages it when
completed. See Public Housing and Integration: A Neglected Opportunity, 6 Colum. J.L. &
Social Prob. 253n.2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Public Housing and Integration]. The
"Turnkey" program is a recent innovation in the public housing area which has won ap-
proval for its efficiency and the greater opportunities it allows for involvement by private
industry. The private developer approaches the authority with a lot and plans for construction
which he offers to deliver at a fixed price. The proposals are formalized in a contract for
sale and the next government involvement does not occur until payment upon completion
of the building. Burstein, New Techniques in Public Housing, 32 Law & Contemp. Prob.
528, 529-30, 536-40 (1967); Wall St. J., June 6, 1966, at 1, col. 1. The third basic program
is known as "Section 23" leasing. Under this approach the local housing authority leases
available private housing up to a general maximum of ten percent of the building's units. In
turn, the authority sublets the units to low-income families at a lower rate. Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1965, 12 US.C.A. § 1701z-3 (Supp. 1974), amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701z-3 (1970) (authorizing the rent supplement program) ; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1421 (Supp.
1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1421 (1970) (creating the leased housing program). Friedman
& Krier, A New Lease on Life: Section 23 Housing and the Poor, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 611
(1968).
16. 81 Cong. Rec. 8099 (1937) (remarks of Senator Wagner); "There are some people
whom we cannot possibly reach; I mean those who have no means to pay the rent minus
the subsidy. This, after all, is a renting proposition, not a complete gift." Id. See Friedman,
Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 642, 645 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Public Housing and the Poor]; Public Housing and Integration 258.
17. Lanham Public War Housing Act of 1940, ch. 862, 54 Stat. 1125, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1521-24 (1970); Exec. Order No. 9070, 3 C.F.R. 1095 (Comp. 1938-1943).
18. Public Housing and the Poor 650-51.
19. Id. at 651.
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authorities were overwhelmed by the influx of minority groups into the urban
ghettos as a result of the unavailability of employment, housing and educational
opportunities in the white-oriented suburbs. Thus, public housing concentrations
rapidly changed from low-middle-class and white to poor and black.20
Compounding the problem was the reluctance of housing authorities to en-
force integration. In fact, the doctrine of "separate but equal" announced in
Plessy v. Ferguson2 ' practically insured that the initial public housing projects
would be racially segregated.P The advent of judicially enforced integration,
following Brown v. Board of Education23 and various state statutes mandating
desegregation,24 failed to change the racial structure of public housing since the
housing authorities, fearing public opposition, did not enforce the spirit of the
neutral regulations. 25 This policy, at least on the federal level, began to change
in the Kennedy Administration.20 Also, both statutes27 and lower court deci-
sions 28 reinforced the policy that the housing authorities must act affirmatively
to integrate public housing.
20. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 115-21 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Kerner Commission]; Mulvihill, Problems in the Management of Public
Housing, 35 Temp. L.Q. 163, 175-78 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Mulvihill].
21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
22. See Comment, The Public Housing Administration and Discrimination in Federally
Assisted Low-Rent Housing, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 871, 875-76 (1966). See also H. Rodgers &
C. Bullock, Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Consequences 141-46
(1972).
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Hous. Law § 223 (McKinney 1955) ("no person shall, because
of race, creed, color or national origin, be subjected to any discrimination").
25. See Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 139 (7th Cir. 1972) (Sprecher, J., dissent-
ing). "For many years the public housing program and its federal and local administrators
have contributed to the increasing segregation of the black inner city from the white suburbs
through discriminatory site selection, ghetto high rise monstrosities, and pervasive foot-
dragging." Id. (footnotes omitted) ; see Public Housing and Integration 258-62.
26. Exec. Order No. 11063, 3 C.F.R. 652-56 (Comp. 1959-63), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)
(historical note). The order barred all discriminatory practices in federally funded public
housing. Its effect has been limited, however, by the tendency of the authorities to apply It
only in the area of site selection. Grier, The Negro Ghettos and Federal Housing Policy,
32 Law & Contemp. Prob. 550, 554-56 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Negro Ghettos and
Federal Housing Policy]; 64 Mich. L. Rev. 871, 878-79 (1966). In addition, some critics
claim that the order was more a statement of a personal position on the part of President
Kennedy. They note that it was not backed by legislation for several years and by itself
had very limitied usage and weak enforcement provisions. Negro Ghettos and Federal
Housing Policy 554; Note, De Facto Segregation in Low-Rent Public Housing, Urban L.
Annual 174, 183-84 (1968) [hereinafter cited as De Facto Segregation in Low-Rent Public
Housing].
27. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970) ; Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3608 (1970); see note 7 supra. See also Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A
Critique, 24 Hastings L.J. 159 (1972).
28. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1970), noted in 8S Harv. L.
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On a practical level, in the major urban areas integrated public housing is
becoming an economic necessity. Since the operating income of conventional
public housing is derived from a pegged system under which the tenant pays a
certain proportion of his income as his monthly rent, the income of the housing
authority is tied closely to tenant income. Unfortunately, even in an era of
economic expansion, the income level of the poor has not increased propor-
tionately. 9 At the same time, the housing authorities are caught in an inflation-
ary squeeze, forcing use of reserves for operation a3 Their only immediate hope,
without increased subsidies, is to retain and attract whites who generally are
able to pay higher rents. 31
II. MODERN METHODS USED TO OFFSET RAciAL SEGREGATION ni
PUBLIC HousnqG
To promote integrated public housing, authorities have utilized two main
weapons--strategic site selection and affirmative tenant assignment. Under the
first method, public housing is constructed in locations where it will be com-
patible with the dual purpose of promoting racial integration and eliminating
deteriorating, substandard housing.32 Consequently many projects have been
built in the blighted inner city areas? 3 This inner city site selection reflected
several additional factors. For example, building in a predominantly white neigh-
borhood is more difficult because of racial and income prejudice0 4 Moreover,
during the substantial lead-time between beginning and completing construction,
the racial composition of the area often deteriorates radically due to "fleeing
whites."3 5
Rev. 870 (1972); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (NMD. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).
29. Walsh, Is Public Housing Headed for a Fiscal Crisis?, 26 J. Housing 64, 65-66 (1969).
30. Mulvihill 176; Walsh, Is Public Housing Headed for a Fiscal Crisis?, 26 J. Housing
64, 65-66 (1969).
31. Mulvihill 175-76; Interview with Neil Hardy, Exec. Director of Rehabilitation,
Mortgage Insurance Corporation, in New York City, Nov. 1, 1973 [hereinafter cited as
Interview].
32. Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Selection, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 63,
69 (1970).
33. Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 490, 503-04 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Public Housing-A Social Experiment
Seeks Acceptance]. A related deleterious effect is the construction of high rise public hous-
ing buildings. These "monstrosities" reflected the desire of public housing officials to econo-
mize in the face of high land costs. Unfortunately, the resultant buildings only reinforced
the public's distaste for the projects. Public Housing and the Poor, supra note 16, at 651-52.
34. Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, De
Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2971 (1970) (statement
of Anthony Downs).
35. Interview; see Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of
Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 245, 302 n.257 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Racial Controls in Housing].
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Affirmative tenant assignment has suffered similar ineffectiveness. For one
thing, the overwhelming number of applications are from minority members
unable to afford private housing.30 In addition, the problems of tenant assign-
ment are closely linked to those of site selection. When most projects are built
in, or close to, ghetto areas, the greater number of available apartments are
located in areas of high minority race concentration. As a result, the projects
reflect the racial composition of the surrounding neighborhood; whites are
loathe to live in such areas.37
Even if it were desirable, it is by no means clear that affirmative tenant selec-
tion would be received favorably by the courts. 8 In Favors v. Randall"O (decided
thirteen years before Brown), the Philadelphia Housing Authority was sued to
enjoin its practice of allotting segregated housing between the races on a per-
centage basis. 40 Relying heavily on the now discredited "separate-but-equal"
doctrine,41 the district court upheld the validity of the quota in light of the ex-
pertise of the housing officials and the actual numerical favoritism shown to
black applicants.4
With the rejection of the Plessy doctrine, however, the courts have viewed
housing quotas more critically. In Taylor v. Leonard,43 a New Jersey court dis-
allowed segregated public housing and refused to employ quotas for admission.
The court stated:
The use of any quota system in admitting Negroes to public housing projects is dis-
criminatory . . . The evil of the quota system is that it assumes that Negroes are
different from other citizens and should be treated differently. Stated another way, the
alleged purpose of a quota system is to prevent Negroes from getting more than their
share of the available housing units. However, this takes for granted that Negroes are
only entitled to the enjoyment of civil rights on a quota basis. 44
36. De Facto Segregation in Low-Rent Public Housing 194.
37. Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance 504. Before 1960, New York
City followed a free choice scheme for allocating public housing. This led to complaints of
racial imbalance as projects tended to reflect the racial make-up of the areas in which they
were located. In order to allay criticism, the housing authorities initiated a policy of holding
all vacancies in white projects for blacks and vice versa. The policy was unsuccessful. The
whites refused to go to areas of high minority concentration and the blacks protested be-
cause badly needed public housing lay dormant in black areas. In 1964, the Housing Author-
ity dropped the idea of enforced tenant assignment and adopted a "first-come-first-served"
system. Id.
38. See Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30, 48-S1 (1960); Do
Facto Segregation in Low-Rent Public Housing 194.
39. 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
40. Id. at 744-45.
41. Id. at 747.
42. Id. at 747-48.
43. 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (Ch. 1954).
44. Id. at 119, 103 A.2d at 633. Note, however, that the permissibility of action based on
group status has long been established in certain areas. For example, the states and the
federal government have laws to prohibit child labor, to favor veterans in public employ-
ment, and to support employees in their efforts to organize and bargain collectively. In all
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Similarly in Banks v. Housing Authority,45 a California court struck down the
use of quotas. There, city officials attempted to distribute housing according
to the existing racial composition in the neighborhood in order to preserve the
the same racial pattern as existed before the project. The court concluded that
the practice could be overturned for several reasons, including the illegality of
a state's executing a lease in such a manner as to violate the boundaries defined
by the fourteenth amendment,46 but based its decision on the impropriety of the
state's attempted engineering of segregated racial patterns.47
Despite these early rejections of the quota system, the issue has not been
settled definitively. Those initial cases involved quotas which merely reinforced
segregated racial patterns in public housing whereas an Otero-type decision
involves a quota which seeks to eliminate such segregated groupings.4 8 Neverthe-
less, there is a more troubling case in the private housing sector against affirma-
tive quotas. In Progress Development Corporation v. Mitchell,4 a builder
purchased land in an exclusive white suburb of Chicago to build fifty-one homes,
one-quarter of which would be retained for sale to minority applicants. To main-
tain the established ratio, the original purchasers gave the corporation the right
to choose subsequent purchasers of their plots. Despite the benevolent motive
of the builders, the court refused to allow the quota on the grounds that any
quota, if allowed, would "circumvent" the holding of Shelley v. Kraemerr'
these situations, the social good achieved through emphasizing the rights of the group over
those of the individual theoretically compensates for the detriment to the sub-group forced
into a less favorable position. See Greenberg, Race Relations and Group Interests in the
Law, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 503 (1959); Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and
"The Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 531, 553-58 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Benign Quota]. A more pertinent example, however, can be shown by the school desegre-
gation cases where the year delay between the original Brown decision and the remedial
order was justified by the existence of an overriding group interest. United States v. Jeffer-
son County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), reaffirmed en banc, 380 F.2d 385,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). The concept of a group right to equal housing access can
be inferred from Barrows v. Jackson, 346 US. 249 (1953). There, the Court refused to
give damages against a white defendant who had breached a restrictive covenant by selling
his property to blacks. In allowing the defendant to plead the civil rights of all blacks in
acquiring property, the Court, in effect, recognized the prospective interests of an unidenti-
fied group of future black purchasers. Id. at 254. For an analysis of an overriding group in-
terest in the benign quota see Racial Controls in Housing, supra note 35, at 275-82.
45. 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert. denied, 347 US. 974 (1954).
46. Id. at 16, 260 P.2d at 677.
47. Id. at 17-18, 260 P.2d at 678.
48. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1118 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Equal Protection]; 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1441, 1448 (1970).
49. 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1960), modified, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961); see 70
Yale L.J. 126 (1960).
50. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley involved racial covenants to exclude blacks from pur-
chasing property in an all-white neighborhood. The Supreme Court stated that such agree-
ments, although not illegal per se, cannot be enforced by the courts without constituting state
action in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 20-21.
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which invalidated judicial enforcement of restrictive racial covenants. The court
also emphasized that a quota, even though it may be attractive to the minority
at the present time, would constitute a "strait jacket . . . a mess of pottage
offered in exchange for a birthright of equality." 5' 1 Moreover, Judge Perry
analogized quotas in housing and in employment:
A controlled integration plan with discriminatory restrictions ... cannot be enforced
in any court in the United States. It would amount to a quota system of housing and
that is just as illegal as the quota system of employment .... 52
Today, of course, affirmative action including racial quotas have been ap-
proved to bring about integration in education and employment.r 3 In addition,
although the court never specifically declared it so, it impliedly set such a quota
in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,5 4 a housing case. There, blacks
brought a class action to enjoin the use of discriminatory site selection and
tenant assignment calculated to maintain the existing pattern of residential
segregation in Chicago. In the judgment order the court limited black tenancy
to 15 percent in the four white projects.55 Although the court did not explain
its use of a quota, it has been suggested that the court's use of this limitation
arose from the fear that the projects would become completely black once the
tipping point was reached. 56
III. THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE USE OF THE TIPPING POINT
AND THE BEN IGN QUOTA
The argument for a benevolent quota in housing is based on the often re-
curring pattern of white flight when blacks begin to move into a housing project
or community in significant numbers.57 As the influx of minorities to the area
increases, the remaining whites grow more conscious of the change-over process.
Eventually, as the white flight continues, the community will cross the tipping
point, i.e. "the theoretical maximum minority group proportion which whites
will tolerate in any given area.158 Thereafter, the change-over process is irrevers-
ible; a wholesale flight of whites is set off, leaving a predominantly black
neighborhood.50
The purpose of the benign quota is to utilize affirmative tenant assignment
51. 182 F. Supp. at 707.
52. Id.
53. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971) (educa-
tion) ; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (em-
ployment).
54. 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (judgment order), aft'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971) ; see 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1441 (1970).
55. 304 F. Supp. at 739; see 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1441, 1447 (1970).
56. 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1441, 1447 (1970).
57. Cohen, The Case for Benign Quotas in Housing, 21 Phylon 20, 21 (1960). For an
extensive discussion of the tipping phenomenon, see Racial Controls in Housing, supra note
35, at 251-60.
58. Benign Quota, supra note 44, at 533.
59. See Racial Controls in Housing 251-54.
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in such a manner as to bring about a gradual reduction of the psychological
barrier of whites to integrated living. The housing authority interjects a re-
striction on the normal entrance of an "invading" minority group at the max-
imum possible level of stability in order to assure the dominant white majority
that they will not be inundated by an overwhelming influx of minorities6 0
Once assured of a stably integrated habitat, the two groups will gradually de-
velop a certain degree of neighborly contacts.6 As these contacts erode the
whites' fear and as both races become further accustomed to integrated living,
the quota-an expedient measure to be used in the transitional stage-will itself
become increasingly more flexible until eventually it becomes expendable6 2
The expected benefits of the minority group from use of benign quotas are
substantial. Initially there are immediate material advantages as the blacks and
other disadvantaged minorities-whose housing is "generally far more expensive,
more crowded and less adequate than comparable housing for whites'"3-are
able to procure better housing and community services at a lower cost. In addi-
tion, there are psychological advantages in that the feeling of rejection caused
by segregation becomes less substantial.64 Finally, successful implementation of
racial quotas in public housing demonstrates the feasibility of racially mixed
housing in the private sector.
65
60. If the quota system is allowed by the courts, it is possible that the limit need not
be established by the state. Assuming a genuine good faith effort to further integrate hous-
ing, there is no reason why a private organization could not set such a limit provided, of
course, there are adequate safeguards against its abuse. See Equal Protection 1119.
61. See M. Deutsch & M. Collins, Interracial Housing: A Psychological Evaluation of a
Social Experiment 122-23 (1951). This study of several segregated and desegregated public
housing projects in the Northeast is the first and most widely cited authority in the area.
The results showed that residents in desegregated projects held more favorable attitudes
toward members of another racial group than did those tenants in the segregated projects.
Id. The general theory under which the benevolent quota operates is that "tolerant racial
attitudes by members of each race toward the other are positively associated with: (1) the
amount of current equal-status interracial contact (neighboring); (2) the degree of pre-
vious equal-status contacts with members of other [sic] race; (3) the length of residence
within a desegregated housing environment; and (4) the lack of perceived status threat
from living in a desegregated residential surrounding." Ford, Interracial Public Housing in
a Border City: Another Look at the Contact Hypothesis, 78 Am. J. of Soc. 1426, 1430
(1973).
62. See Benign Quota 535; see Comment, Race Quotas, 8 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L.
Rev. 128, 177-78 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Race Quotas].
63. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem
of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 363, 391 (1966).
64. Green, Reparations for Blacks?, 90 Commonweal 359, 360-361 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Reparations for Blacks]. For a discussion of the psychological harm caused to both
black and white by segregation see A. Davis, The United States Supreme Court and the
Uses of Social Science Data 120-29 (1973); cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205 (1972); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The long-term social
and economic opportunities within the society for the minorities also are enhanced. Race
Quotas 159-60.
65. See Note, Racial Discrimination in Housing, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 539 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Racial Discrimination in Housing].
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There are, of course, substantial criticisms. On a practical level, generally it
will prove much more difficult for a black to acquire suitable private housing
than a corresponding white. Therefore, if a black is refused available public
housing because he is not within the quota, the burden of finding housing else-
where is much greater.60 Another detrimental factor may be the additional hos-
tility aroused in whites at being forced to accept blacks as neighbors or, pos-
sibly, having their applications refused because of their majority status.0 7
Psychologically, the classification according to race, despite the benevolent ob-
jective, is not a particularly attractive concept. Although the majority member
feels no racial stigma because of his color, the use of the benign quota implies
to both black and white that the former is racially inferior and needs special
state protection.6
8
Perhaps the primary criticism is found in the nature of the tipping point it-
self. In reality, it is merely an estimate of white racism and reaction to the black
encroachment. As a result, it is subject to a wide range of fluctuation in response
to many subjective factors such as the geographic location, the intensity of
community prejudice, the availability of low cost private housing and abuse
by those officials, including judges, charged with implementing the quota.00
Indeed, the quota could become a strait jacket which would inhibit rather than
advance the cause of racial integration.70 To prevent such abuses would necessi-
tate constant legal supervision by an already overburdened judiciary.71
66. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). "It Is no
secret that in the present state of our society discrimination in the housing market means
that a change for the worse is generally more likely for members of minority races than for
other displacees." Id. at 931; see Kerner Commission 118-19.
67. See W. Ford, Interracial Public Housing in Border City 72-73 (1972). DespIte the
fact that the majority of both races stated that their views towards the other race became
more favorable rather than less so, a large minority claimed no change in attitudes and 42
percent of the whites tested showed that their attitude towards the blacks had become less
favorable. Ford, however, states that "it would appear as if the threat of a 'Negro Invasion'
precipitated more negative feelings toward blacks than did actually residing in a desegre-
gated project." Id. at 60.
68. Bolner, Toward a Theory of Racial Reparations, 29 Phylon 41, 43 (1968); Repara-
tions for Blacks 360-61. But see Judge Scileppi's criticism of this approach in Vetere v.
Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 271-75, 206 N.E.2d 174, 178-80, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, 83-86 (ScileppI, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965).
69. Racial Controls in Housing, supra note 35, at 255; Racial Discrimination In Housing,
supra note 65, at 538.
70. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 707 (N.D. III. 1960), modified,
286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Benign Quota 558-59; Race Quotas 168.
71. In the past, the judiciary has felt unqualified to act in this area. As a result, tradi-
tionally it has declined to interfere in the regulation of public housing unless a clear abuse
of administrative power has been shown. Thompson v. Housing Auth., 251 F. Supp. 121, 124
(S.D. Fla. 1966); see Green St. Ass'n v. Daley, 250 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd on
other grounds, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967) ; cf. Note, Violations
by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 629, 650 (1974). Such an active role,
however, is not completely alien to the courts which have acted, albeit reluctantly, in the areas
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IV. VALIDITY OF THE BENIGN QUOTA IN PuBLIC HOUSING UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
From a constitutional viewpoint, the pivotal question in determining whether
the housing authorities will be allowed to use the benign quota, or whether
its use will be denied them as a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause, is the standard of review chosen by the courts.P The standard
of review in equal protection cases depends on several key concepts. In most
situations, the equal protection clause merely requires that the legislation be
found "reasonable in light of its purpose."" 3 However, where either a funda-
mental interest or a suspect classification is involved, the state, in addition to
meeting the rational basis test, bears a "far heavier burden of justification,"' as
the courts have adopted a stricter standard of review, a more "rigid scrutiny."" 5
Under the stricter standard of judicial review, if the interest is deemed funda-
mental, then any legislation which would substantially impinge upon its exercise
must undergo the rigors of the compelling state interest test in order to be
upheldY6 Until recently, the status of a "right" to housing as a fundamental
interest was unsettled. 77 The Supreme Court had indicated both an awareness
of the pressing importance of housing and a concern for equal access.78 However,
the "Burger" Court apparently has retrenched against the extension of the funda-
mental interest concept into new areas."0 In an eviction case, Lindsey v. Nor-
of civil rights when no other branch of government was willing to do so; see, e.g., Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (reapportionment); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(education).
72. Equal Protection, supra note 48, at 1106-07; see Benign Quota 544-58; Race Quotas
173-80. See also Frederick, The Legality of Affirmative Measures to Achieve and Maintain
Integration in a New Town, 59 Geo. L.J. 335, 340-47 (1970).
73. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
74. Id. at 194 (1964); see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
75. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944).
76. Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 605, 610 (1973); Equal Protection 1120-21.
77. The rationale advanced by the supporters of the proposition is based on two argu-
ments. First, studies have indicated the crucial relationship between a suitable place to live
and normal mental development. See, e.g., G. Grier & E. Grier, Equality and Beyond 31-SO
(1966); Spengler, Population Pressure, Housing, and Habitat in Housing S-11 (Everett &
Johnston ed. 1968). In addition, inadequate housing is generally a reflection of poverty or
racial discrimination both of which are "suspect classifications." Note, Low-Income Housing
and The Equal Protection Clause, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 343, 346-48 (1971); see Note, Decent
Housing as a Constitutional Right-42 U.S.C. § 1983-Poor People's Remedy for Depriva-
tion, 14 How. L.J. 338 (1968).
78. Hunter V. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 388-91 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Block v. Hlrsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921). The Supreme Court has found
that the right to a property interest in land is "an essential pre-condition to the realization
of other basic civil rights and liberties which the [fourteenth] Amendment was intended to
guarantee." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
79. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
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met,8° the Court rejected appellants' argument that the need for shelter and the
"right to retain peaceful possession of one's home" are fundamental interests: 8'
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We
are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to
dwellings of a particular quality . . . .Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance
of adequate housing ... are legislative, not judicial, functions.8 2
It is clear that the individual has no constitutionally protected, fundamental
right to adequate housing. Therefore, the next question to be asked in deter-
mining the standard of review to be adopted by the courts is whether racial clas-
sifications when used in a benign context will elicit the lesser, rational basis test,
or whether they will trigger the active review which the Court has generally
adopted when evaluating suspect classifications.
In the past the less stringent standard generally has been employed by the
courts in the areas of economic and social legislation.8 3 Basically, the decision
to uphold such a classification as valid rested upon merely showing a rational
relationship between the use of the racial classification and a legitimate state
purpose of dividing the applicants along racial lines.84 Several courts, in hold-
ing benevolent racial classification constitutionally permissible in the areas of
employment and education, have implied that this lesser standard will be
followed.
In Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor8 -
involving employment under the Philadelphia Plan, an affirmative scheme de-
trine on a Changing Court; A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
12-15 (1972). Chief Justice Burger has indicated dissatisfaction with the rigidness of the
strict standard. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Last term, the Supreme Court determined that a new "fundamental right" would only be
found if "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Ind. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
80. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
81. Id. at 73.
82. Id. at 74.
83. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); see, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31-34, 40-44 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74
(1972). See also Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 Yale L.J.
123 (1972).
84. Perhaps the clearest statement of the rational basis test was voiced by Chief Justice
Warren in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961): "Although no precise formula
has been developed, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a
wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than
others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws
result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
85. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
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signed to encourage employment of minority workers on federally subsidized
construction projects-, the court impliedly used the lesser, rational basis stan-
dard of review. It based its holding on the rational connection between the ex-
ecutive branch's use of a quota and its desire to develop the largest possible
pool of skilled labor from which to draw workers in projects in which the gov-
ernment has an interest.8 6 Similarly, in a recent Second Circuit decision, Pride v.
Community School Board,87 involving the assignment of children because of their
race to a school away from their neighborhood, the court implied that the less
stringent rational basis test would be applied where racial classifications are used
for a benevolent purpose:
Cases applying that [stricter] standard invariably involve state action having a segre-
gatory or discriminatory effect. No court has applied the test where state action has
had the effect and objective of reducing discrimination and segregation.su
Despite the fact that the rational basis standard can be satisfied easily in pub-
lic housing by the desirability of assuring integrated housing, it has not been and
should not be employed in this context. A clear distinction can be made between
the use of the benign quota in housing and its use in other areas. In education,
for instance, none of the pupils supposedly will suffer. Since the public school
system provides an education for all children, all will receive the additional
benefit of attending an integrated school. In housing, however, in spite of the
benevolent context in which it is framed, both black and white will be excluded
because of race.89 Those who are turned away must obtain housing on the open
market. As previously noted, the effect on the minorities is especially detri-
mental because of the greater likelihood that they will be unable to procure
suitable alternative housingP
Although the rationale behind the use of the stricter standard was not clearly
developed in Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,0' Judge Hays con-
cluded in Pride that the Otero court had adopted the stricter standard because
of the outright denial of new public housing based on race.02 Under this stan-
dard, in addition to demonstrating the rationality of the quota system, the state
must demonstrate a far heavier burden of justification.
86. Id. at 171.
87. 488 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1973).
88. Id. at 326-27 (emphasis added). The rationale underlying the use of racial classifica-
tions in this context is that their objective is to "remedy, not perpetuate, racial discrimi-
nation." Race Quotas, supra note 62, at 175. Supporters of the benign quota make a distinction
between discrimination with an invidious purpose and that without. See E. Corwin, The Con-
stitution and What It Means Today 414 (penn. ed. rev. H. Chase & C. Ducat 1973). The
assumption is that the courts will be able to evaluate the purpose and use of the quota to
decide if it is, in reality, benevolent and should be allowed. Id.
89. 488 F.2d at 327 n.3; Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122. 1136
(2d Cir. 1973).
90. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
91. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
92. 488 F.2d at 327 n.3.
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Clearly, benign quotas are rational. Nevertheless, it is not so clear that state
housing authorities can justify their use when confronted with the compelling
state interest test. A ground which can be suggested to meet this burden is the
conjunction of two separate factors: first, the necessity of overcoming the
specific segregatory effect of past governmental actions and, second, the growth
of a strong national policy favoring integration.
Initially, for the government to succeed in its affirmative duty of furthering
integrated public housing, it must offset past and present governmental prac-
tices which have contributed, either purposely or as an unintended collateral
effect, to the growth of segregated inner city public housing.03 For example, in
the past the federal government has subsidized the growth of the predominantly
white suburban rings around our urban areas through credit assistance and
mortgage insurance. Until the late 1950s, government officials, in order to pro-
tect the government investment, openly suggested that these new neighborhoods
use restrictive racial covenants to protect themselves from invasion by incom-
patible racial and social groups.9 4 Moreover, despite post-Brown changes in
government policy, the pattern of residential segregation which characterizes
suburban areas remains unchanged as the "self-reinforcing nature of residential
segregation" 95 is enhanced by the discriminatory practices of the private housing
industry.96 Although the government no longer directly fosters racial segregation
in the suburbs, it does so indirectly by permitting limited government subsidies
in the form of income tax deductions for both local property taxes 7 and interest
payments on the home-owners' mortgage debt.9 8
Inside the city, racial integration in private housing has been retarded ef-
fectively by an unwritten agreement between the government and financial
institutions such as banks and insurance companies, that areas of high minority
race concentration are risky areas for investment because of their "unfavorable
economic future."99 Additionally, the slum clearance program, although a source
of badly needed housing, has had the unfortunate side effective of increasing the
93. See H. Rodgers & C. Bullock, Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their
Consequences 141-46 (1972); Southern Regional Council, The Federal Executive and Civil
Rights 37-38 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Federal Executive and Civil Rights]. It has been
suggested that the government is so intrinsically intertwined in the process as to be "con-
stitutionally responsible" for segregated housing. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation:
A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 279, 330-33 (1972).
94. Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, Do
Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2755 (1970) (remarks of
Secretary Romney) [hereinafter cited as De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination];
see, e.g., R. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto 217-22 (1948); Federal Executive and Civil Rights
37-38; Negro Ghettos and Federal Housing Policy, supra note 26, at 554.
99. U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools 38 (1967).
96. Id. at 33; See H. Rodgers & C. Bullock, Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws
and Their Consequences 143 (1972).
97. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 164(a) (1).
98. Id. at § 163 (a).
99. De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination, supra note 94, at 2755 (remarks
of Secretary Romney). Such a policy not only restrained involvement by the private housing
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pressure for available public housing from displaced minorities.' 00 Finally, the
structure of the federal housing program, which allows for extensive decentraliza-
tion of control to local authorities, often has proved a hindrance to the use of
site selection and other programs to effectuate integrated public housing because
local officials are more susceptible to pressure from the local populace.10 1
In light of the ineffectiveness of past remedial regulations, the Supreme Court
has adopted extensive affirmative remedies in other areas. In Swanm v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,0 2 the Court held a neutral pupil assignment
plan unacceptable to carry out the mandate of Brown because it was inadequate
to remedy "the continuing effects of past school segregation resulting from dis-
criminatory location of school sites or distortion of school size .... "103 In its
place, the Court set out broad guidelines of affirmative action including racial
quotas.10 4 Despite the warning of the Court as to the limited use to be allowed
for racial quotas, 105 a clear analogy can be drawn between the state's promotion
and maintenance of segregation in public housing and in public education. In
both, discriminatory practices have deprived the minority of equal opportunities
to enjoy a government-provided benefit. Therefore, in light of the affirmative
duty to further integrate housing, it is quite plausible that a benevolent racial
classification should be allowed as one method to reverse the racial discrimina-
tion which governmental action has helped to create. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the broad remedial power of the court in the area of integration.100
sources in these areas but also contributed to their physical deterioration, adding further
incentive for whites to leave.
100. Hart v. Community School Bd., No. 72-1041, at 53 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1974); see,
e.g., Note, The Federal Courts and Urban Renewal, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 472, 474-76 (1969).
For an example of a somewhat successful program, however, see Gergen, Renewal in the
Ghetto: A Study of Residential Rehabilitation in Boston's Washington Park, 3. Harv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 243 (1967).
101. Public Housing and Integration, supra note 15, at 260-62.
102. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
103. Id. at 28.
104. Id. at 22-31.
105. Id. at 22-23.
106. Id. at 15-16; see, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973), where the
Court said: "In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary
power .... Moreover, in constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a
special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable." (citation & footnote
omitted). See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), wherein the Court ob-
served: "Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Id. at
300 (footnotes omitted). In a related context, the courts have recognized the need for
affirmative action to end voting discrimination. In response to federal legislation, the south-
em states enacted neutral regulations for registering voters. Nevertheless, they proved in-
effective to increase black registration. As a result, the Fifth Circuit adopted a "freezing"
concept under which presently neutral voting qualification tests were suspended so that
blacks could be registered under the lighter standards which had been applied to whites in
the past. United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Ward,
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In Louisiana v. United States10 7 which invalidated a state test used to deprive
the blacks of their right to vote, Justice Black noted that:
the court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far
as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimi-
nation in the future.'0 8
In conjunction with the need to overcome the effect of past governmental
actions which have enhanced the growth of segregated urban areas, the heavy
burden of justification can further be met by the development of a strong na-
tional policy toward affirmative action to eliminate racial segregation in housing.
Ever since the Kennedy Administration, it has been the official policy of the
executive branch of the federal government to eliminate segregation in public
housing.109 Similarly, congressional awareness of the problem and the need for
an effective remedy is demonstrated clearly by the discretion Congress has dele-
gated to federal housing authorities in dealing with the problems of the urban
areas." 0 Under the Housing Act of 1949, race was not of prime congressional
concern."' By 1964, however, Congress ordered them not only to take cogni-
zance of race as a factor in public housing, but also to veto any plan which would
have the end effect of segregated housing." 2 Four years later, prodded perhaps
by the urban ghetto riots," 3 Congress directed the federal housing authorities
to take affirmative action to achieve and promote fair housing." 4
Judicial recognition of the problem and of the need for affirmative action to
349 F.2d 795, 802-05 (5th Cir. 1965). For a discussion of "the freezing doctrine" see Note,
Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1051, 1137-49 (1965).
107. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
108. Id. at 154.
109. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652-56 (Supp. 1962), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)
(historical note).
110. See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1970). The attitude toward public
housing and integration prevalent in the legislative branch is particularly important. Unlike
the executive, who is elected for a four-year term of office, and the judiciary, which serves
on good behavior, the House of Representatives must face re-election every two years. Con-
sequently, they tend to reflect the will of the populace much more accurately than do the
coordinate branches.
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970); cf. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d at 816.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)-(d) (1) (1970) ; see note 7 supra.
113. Public Housing and Integration, supra note 15, at 258-59. Political support for tic
public housing program has fluctuated. Initially the middle class who, during the Depres-
sion, saw themselves to be the primary beneficiaries of the program, supported it enthusi-
astically. When the projects began to fill their rent rolls with minority group members, the
mass political appeal of public housing was seriously impaired. During the 1950s a great
hostility toward the program flourished in Congress and several times it came to the brink
of being discontinued, see 101 Cong. Rec. 12107 (1955) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (famous
socialized public-housing project is as dead as a doornail.) ; Mulvihill, supra note 20, at 167-68.
With the 1960s, however, and the urban ghetto riots, the public housing program has recov-
ered some of its lost popularity. Public Housing and Integration 258-59.
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3608 (1970).
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further integration has paralleled the growth of executive and legislative concern.
In Brown, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the psychological and socio-
logical harm caused by segregation in the classroom, yet it seemed unaware of
any need for affirmative action. 15 In the intervening twenty years, however, the
Court, faced by local recalcitrance to obey its mandate, has moved from a stan-
dard of "all deliberate speed"" 86 to a strong affirmative stance including the use
of racial quotas to achieve desegregation."17 The lower courts also have man-
dated racial quotas as a method for desegregating the schools."18 For example,
in DeFunis v. Odegaard,119 a white applicant who had been refused admission
to the state law school despite his superior qualifications brought suit to restrain
the state law school from accepting black applicants whose qualifications were
less impressive than his own. The state court refused to issue a restraining order
on the ground that the state has an "overriding" interest in procuring a better
representation of minorities in its law school.120 Although the Supreme Court has
not encountered the question of benign classifications specifically in housing,
several lower federal courts have endorsed the use of racial classification in this
area,' 2 ' reasoning:
Where [a racial classification] is drawn for the purpose of achieving equality it will be
allowed, and to the extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by race, it will
be required.'12 2
V. CONCLUSION
Segregation in housing is a harmful reality. In conjunction with other types
of discrimination such as that evidenced in employment and education, it has
formed the bulwark of a racially divided society.lea Over the last decade, how-
ever, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government have em-
115. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
116. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
117. Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968): "The burden on a school board today is to
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to
work now." Last term, the Court reemphasized that neutral regulations, even if they had
been in effect for many years, did not allay the state's affirmative duty to integrate public
schools where a current segregated system existed largely because of a pre-Brown state im-
posed dual system. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973).
118. E.g., Booker v. Special School Dist., 351 F. Supp. 799, 810 (D. Minn. 1972).
119. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P2d 1169, vacated as moot and remanded, 42 U.S.L.W. 4578
(U.S. Apr. 23, 1974) (per curiam).
120. Id. at 33, 507 P.2d at 1182.
121. See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Garrett v. City of Ham-
tramck, 357 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
122. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932 (2d Cir. 1968) (foot-
notes omitted). In light of Otero, Pride, and Norwalk, it is inferable that the Second Circuit
has decided as a matter of policy that racial qualifications will be allowed provided they
are for a genuinely benevolent purpose.
123. Hart v. Community School Bd., No. 72-1041, at 48-61 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1974).
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ployed affirmative remedies, including benign racial classifications, to assure
greater equality in public and quasi-public employment and education. Unfor-
tunately, despite the long-term possibilities opened up by new types of public
housing,124 the measures currently available for use by the housing officials to
maintain integrated urban areas have proven largely ineffective.
In light of this, judicial recognition of the benign quota, as a constitutionally
permissible measure, is desirable on several grounds. First, such a recognition re-
affirms the existence of a community interest in maintaining a balanced racial
atmosphere.12 5 Second, judicial cognizance of the tipping process and the need
for affirmative action to retain fleeing whites in racially transitional housing de-
velopments should lead to the acceptance of the need for a more innovative
judicial approach in correcting this type of segregation.
In Otero, Judge Mansfield established a very stringent standard in the heavy
burden of justification he placed on the government's attempt to use it.120 Under
this test, the benign quota could only be used as a preventive mechanism to
maintain integration in a critically threatened area. Unfortunately, at that point
it is questionable whether even the introduction of such a stabilizing factor could
meet with much success. Therefore, benign racial quotas should be allowed as an
affirmative access tool to head off white flight at an earlier stage and also to in-
troduce substantial numbers of minorities into what are now predominantly
white projects. Following the rationale advanced above, quotas would also be
permissible for the latter purpose, provided adequate safeguards against their
abuse are established.
Timothy R. Graham
124. See note 15 supra. For more ambitious suggestions, such as population movements
through persuasive government tactics, see Zelder, Residential Desegregation: Can Nothing
Be Accomplished? 5 Urban Affairs Q. 265, 274-76 (1970). Note also the pessimistic attitude
toward the possibility of using conventional public housing as a mode for integrated living
in Solomon, Housing and Public Policy Analysis, 20 Pub. Policy 443, 452-55 (1972).
125. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); Barrck
Realty Inc. v. Gary, No. 73-1279 (7th Cir. Jan. 24, 1974).
126. 484 F.2d at 1135.
